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What is the significance of history for a society which diligently and obediently has 
tucked its history into a Procrustean bed? A society that treated the past according to 
Ptolemaic laws? Ptolemy's ideas were simple and useful; one clearly sees the sun rising 
in its orbit and circling the earth. The triumph of socialism on all fronts was equally 
obvious. History textbooks overflowed with the dry remains of the ideas of Lenin-Stalin 
and, to a slightly lesser degree, of Marx-Engels. Paradoxically, history became an exact 
science; its formulas and hypotheses became axiomatic, no longer requiring evidence.
Today, as we structure our identity, we also begin to study our past. We begin with a 
void, with what there is not, with the investigation of emptiness and the absence of 
speech. The effort to pierce this veil of heavy silence consists of recapturing and 
revealing our history. This is a tangible process, and it is already manifest.
The newfound ability to look at facts without prejudice, without an a priori construct into 
which facts must be fitted, presents us with an opportunity to reclaim our history. 
Memory is an element of social consciousness, which fundamentally must be historical 
in nature. By straining our memories we seek to find meaning in our lives, to understand 
our place in history, and ultimately to know ourselves.
Our memory of the past is distorted; it harbored collective mythologies and was the 
object of prolonged manipulation by the authorities. History is called upon to overcome 
this condition. In the Russian State University for the Humanities we have just 
completed work on the six-volume Russia of the Twentieth Century. This is the first 
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major effort to restore Russian history on the basis of logic and fact, rather than a priori 
constructs. We have attempted to exert some influence on the peculiar relationship 
between memory and history that developed over the decades of Soviet rule, to bring 
them together by transforming our history from a factory of lies into a means of 
liberation. This effort can help the collective memory rid itself of those aspects that the 
regime tries to retain in the "official memory."
This reclaiming of history involves mastering hitherto concealed documents. The point 
of departure for most Sovietologists was that the big picture of Soviet history had 
already been drawn--the remaining research would develop the details, but not alter 
radically the thematic and factual outline. It was believed that no new ordering of 
names, dates, and events would do more than focus and sharpen the picture; it would 
not alter the factual basis of macrohistory. This approach was sufficient for the period up  
to and including the Gorbachev years when, for the most part, we merely were 
confirming truths widely available in Western Sovietology, but inaccessible to our own 
subterranean history.
Newly publicized facts do more than simply accumulate detail. Frequently they alter our 
perception of the past, mercilessly destroying national stereotypes. It is now clear that 
the materials on the Lenin period, World War II, and the Cold War currently being 
published not only affect concepts of Russian history but also the nature of world history 
in this century.
In 1938 the Russian government archives were transferred to NKVD oversight. Since 
then, scholarly admittance to the archives has been highly problematic: Access was 
tightly controlled and in effect the use of archival materials was censured by party and 
archive organs. This led to falsification and distortion of history, a narrowing of the 
documentary basis for scholarship, and self-censorship about certain facts and events 
to please particular personalities and to agree with ruling doctrines. As a result, creative 
discussions and arguments ceased as early as the 1930s; instead, historians merely 
illustrated party documents, speeches, and presentations.
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During the Khrushchev "Thaw," government and party archives were slightly more 
accessible, with immediate effect upon the study of history; a whole series of 
documentary publications and scholarly works appeared (for instance, on the history of 
collectivization and the peasantry). Unfortunately, this period did not last long. After 
Khrushchev was removed, Stalinism was revived, with a particularly pernicious effect on 
the humanities. S. P. Trapeznikov, a historian by profession and an ardent Stalinist by 
calling, was placed at the head of the sciences department and the education organs of 
the CPSU Central Committee. Again, many archival collections as a whole arbitrarily 
were deemed secret; in other cases, particular documents would not be shown to 
scholars unless the appropriate agencies consented.
In effect scholars lost access completely to materials from the SovNarKom (Council of 
People's Commissars) and Gosplan, TseIKa (Central Executive Committee) and 
VTseIKaa (Supreme Central Executive Committee), and VChK-OGPU-NKVD (the 
organs that subsequently were named the KGB). All party archives, central as well as 
local, were classified; access was forbidden not only to scholars who were not party 
members but also to party members without special clearance for secret work. The 
active archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Kremlin archive of the 
Politburo were completely secret; one could not even speak of them.
When it was first proclaimed in the 1980s, glasnost' was intended to be partial and 
gradual, although it proved to be the major condition for fundamental change. Yet, even 
the first steps towards declassifying government archives served to broaden access for 
historians and prompted the publication of documentary sources as well as monographs 
based on those sources.
Access to Archives 
The last few years have been characterized by the publication of documentary 
collections and the emergence of journals specializing in such materials. For instance, 
in 1991, The Diary of Emperor Nikolas II, P.A. Stolypin's The Complete Collection of 
Speeches in the State Duma and the State Council, 1906-1911, and N.V. Lamzorov's 
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Diary 1894-1896, among others were published. The journal, Historical Archive, again is 
in circulation, as are four issues of the series Zvenya (Links), and three issues of 
Unknown Russia: The Twentieth Century. Almost every professional journal has 
published previously classified materials from the Soviet, and in some cases even the 
pre-Soviet, period.
There also has been a trend toward new editions of previously published materials, 
works like the twenty-volume Archive of the Russian Revolution, which was first 
published in Berlin in the 1920s, the sixteen-volume almanac Menyvsheye (The Past), 
the collection Beloe Delo (White Cause), and the memoirs of leading figures among the 
Whites--Denikin, Vrangel, Krasnov, Milykov.
The volumes previously held in special collections are now available for scholarly and 
literary pursuits and those working with these materials no longer have to fear 
persecution. The Russian Foreign Historical Archive (RZIA) is now accessible to the 
public. This collection of over 350,000 sources on the history of the Whites was founded 
in the 1920s by White activists living in exile in Prague and after World War II was given 
by the Czechoslovak government to the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
Overall, local authorities have been more courageous in declassifying archives than the 
central government. To this day, the Kremlin archives of the Politburo of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU (now called the Presidential Archive) are closed to research. 
This collection contains the most valuable sources, those that document the policy-
making and implementation process in foreign and domestic matters. The archives of 
active ministries and departments, only now are beginning to be utilized for scholarly 
purposes.
However, some documents have been published on one of the most painful subjects in 
Russian history, the peasantry. Material from the Presidential Archive renders possible 
the determination of the particular roles of the party-governmental leaders during the 
late twenties and thirties in the persecution of the peasantry (forced collectivization, 
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persecution of kulaks, and deportation of millions of peasants in the course of Stalin's 
revolution from above).
Documents from the archives reveal that repression against the peasantry continued 
and in some cases intensified after collectivization was complete. For instance, we now 
have a decision of the Politburo of the Communist Party's Central Committee from 2 
July 1937, "On anti-Soviet Elements," forwarded by Stalin to N.I. Yezhov (NKVD), 
kraikom and obkom secretaries, and Central Committees of Communist Parties of the 
Union and Autonomous Republics. This documents suggests that "the majority of former 
kulaks and criminals, who have been exiled to Northern and Siberian rayons, upon their 
return from exile to their former oblasts ought to be monitored so that the most hostile 
among them can be immediately arrested and shot," and the others exiled. In 
accordance with this decision, more than 72,000 persons were subject to execution and 
more than 270,000 were subject to exile. This occurred after 1932, the year in which 
Stalin himself had concluded that "kulazhevstvo, as a class," has been destroyed.
The Phenomenon of Soviet Historiography
The study of Soviet historiography approaches its analysis from two different, though 
related, directions: First, the role of history in Soviet society, and second, the inner life of 
the discipline, its structure, rules, priorities, thematics, methodology, and style.
This task is complicated by the fact that in the country "of the triumphant socialist 
revolution," understanding current events was never a high priority. The political leaders, 
who were also the main ideologues, had an unassailable and predetermined 
interpretation of current and past events: The country experienced a socialist revolution 
in accordance with the laws discovered by Marx and Engels, and developed by Lenin, 
Stalin, and the Communist Party. The historians labored to prove what had long been 
obvious for the founders.
This is the traditional approach to scholarship for the entire history of Marxist-Leninist 
thought. First Marx writes The Communist Manifesto, in which he outlines the basics of 
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the Marxist approach to social processes, and after twenty years he writes Capital, 
which contains the thesis essential for the conclusions outlined earlier in the Manifesto. 
First Lenin presents scathing criticism of the narodniki (populists) for underestimating 
the state of capitalist development in Russia, and then writes Capitalist Development in 
Russia. Lenin tells a congress of communist parties that socialist revolution proceeds 
according to a scientific pattern (at the time most people in the country and in the party 
referred to it modestly as an overthrow of the regime). Then for ten years historians 
endeavor to confirm this assertion, until after Stalin's "explanation" they discover that 
the pronouncements of top leaders do not require any confirmation. First comes the 
announcement that the country has reached advanced socialism, and then for two 
decades historians ponder what advanced socialism is and when was it built?
The language and problem areas of Soviet historiography stem from these general 
principles. Formation, process, class, party, law, Marxism, proletariat--these words are 
the foundations of the new historiographical vocabulary. From the first Soviet historians 
to the late 1980s the most widely used term in Soviet historiography was "struggle." 
Hence the formulation of the main themes in historical research: the history of the 
revolutionary movement in Russia, the history of the Russian revolutions, the history of 
class and party struggle, the history of the Bolshevik Party, and the two overarching 
themes for the whole period of Soviet historiography--all things pertaining to Lenin and 
the history of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
A Cog in the System
This tendency could have remained an isolated phenomenon--merely the 
historiographical reflection of a particular political situation. Instead it became a 
determining feature of the new historiography. Using all the means at its disposal, the 
political leadership gradually transformed the discipline into a cog in the governing 
political system. Consequently, the differences between Russian and European 
historiography, which were visible soon after the revolution, grew until Russian 
historiography approached isolation.
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From the beginning the Soviet regime developed new principles to guide the interaction 
between the government and the sciences. Naturally, the pre-existing relative autonomy 
of scientific centers and universities was no longer acceptable. The Academy of 
Sciences--with its branches and institutes, its traditions of academic freedom and 
opposition--became an alien element. Of course, the Academy could have been 
liquidated altogether, especially since those it brought together were hardly Marxist. 
Instead, the new regime saw an opportunity to transform what had been a purely 
scholarly organization into an organ for maintaining ideological purity in the various 
disciplines. Science had a well-defined structure; it would have been a sin to waste it. 
This solution must have seemed optimal to the new leadership since it allowed for the 
pretense of championing science. With similar goals in mind, new associations of 
writers, artists, theatrical personnel, etc. were formed.
Since few in the Academy of Sciences could be counted among Marxists or supporters 
of the new government, there came a decision to create parallel Marxist scholarly 
centers. A June 1918 decree was issued on the creation of a Socialist Academy, in 
August the VTseIKa confirmed its membership, and the Academy opened on 1 October. 
In August 1920 a commission on party history (Istpart) was created; it quickly 
monopolized the storage, processing, publication, and study of the history of the 
October Revolution and the Bolshevik party. Soon the commission was transferred from 
the aegis of People's Commissariat to the Communist Party Central Committee. In 1921 
the Institute of Marx and Engels was founded, followed in 1923 by the establishment of 
the Lenin Institute. In 1921 the Institute of Red Professors came into being and in 1923 
the Russian Association of Social Science Research Institutes was created. By 1925, 
the Bolsheviks were strong enough to reorganize radically the Academy of Sciences 
(just in time for its 200th anniversary) and install purely Marxist structures. In 1936 the 
Communist Academy (formerly Socialist) was inserted into the Academy of Sciences, 
spelling the end of the traditionally "bourgeois" organization.
The Soviet state needed historians for whom political expediency ranked ahead of 
historical accuracy. This criterion was reflected not only in professional historical training 
7
but also in character formation. A historian was a professional to the degree to which he 
defined himself as a "party activist." This condition frequently led to professional and 
moral deformities.
During one of the most loathsome political campaigns of the Soviet regime--the 
campaign against "cosmopolitanism" based on nationalism and antisemitism--the 
leading scholars demonstrated their loyalty to state and party and accepted the roles 
assigned to them. Characteristically, forty years later a prolific and talented historian, 
L.V. Cherepin, was to describe this Black Hundreds orgy as a wide exchange of views 
"on questions of theory and ideology, which raised the level of historical scholarship."
Under the Soviet regime, the authorities and the historians came to an understanding; 
the authorities would strive to subordinate everything and the historians would strive to 
submit. This precluded the possibility of creative, independent thinking and installed 
self-censorship, which for many historians to this day remains an even greater obstacle 
than the feudal dependence on party decisions.
For Russian historiography the crisis of the communist world view is particularly painful. 
Russian historians face a complicated problem of learning new research skills and 
methodologies and basing their efforts on a culture of dialogue. For a long time the 
historian's relationship with sources was that of a detective rather than of a researcher--
we did not have a critical "dialogue" with the sources, we interrogated them, reserving 
the prerogative to judge them. No wonder that today the information explosion has left 
historians puzzled and unprepared.
Moreover, the emergence of a new information system did not resolve all the problems 
related to ensuring access for scholarship. Relying on confused and inconsistent 
directions from the highest authorities, including the president, official departments and 
organizations retain their "right" to classify documents arbitrarily. As a consequence the 
historian's dream of a unified information space is disappearing at a rapid rate.
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